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This paper focuses on the involvement of the international community (international actors) in 
post-conflict reconstruction in the context of multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) operating in the 
issue-area of reconciliation, inter-communal bridge-building and confidence-building. In particular, 
the paper analyses the international-local linkages within the MSPs, and suggests that although 
the involvement of the international community in post-conflict reconstruction (peace-building) is 
heavy and indispensable, it is neither straight-forward nor problem-free. In order to understand these 
linkages in a specific MSP context, a number of factors need to be taken into account and analysed. 
The paper suggests that at least three levels of analysis are required in order to understand the 
role of the international community and the international-local linkages in the context of MSPs 
addressing reconciliation, confidence-building and inter-community bridge-building in a post-conflict 
context. Firstly, the very complex nature of the international community itself, with many different 
actors seeking to achieve their own objectives in a very competitive environment; secondly, the very 
difficult conditions in war-torn societies that are operationally/institutionally unable to begin any 
peace-building processes on their own; and thirdly, the characteristics (motivations, organisation) of 
international and domestic actors themselves.
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Introduction
The purpose of this article1 is to bring to attention and provide a preliminary 
analysis of the role of the so-called international-local linkages within multi-
stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) – a new form of global multilateralism 
or multilateral co-operation “beyond intergovernmental diplomacy” or 
“traditional nation-state multilateralism” (Martens 2007: 4) – in the issue-
area of reconciliation, inter-communal bridge-building and confidence-
building in post-conflict societies. This issue-area of international relations 
can be broadly understood as “a frame of reference that focuses on 
the restoration and rebuilding of relationships” because in a post-conflict 
context, rational approaches to resolving conflict issues tend to be 
ineffective (Lederach 1997: 24). 
Importantly, reconciliation, inter-communal bridge-building and 
confidence-building are long-term, deep and broad processes of 
relationship-(re)building (Kriesberg 2001, Lederach 2001, McCandles 2001, 
Bloomfield et al. 2003, Bar-Tal and Bennink 2004, Hamber and Kelly 2004). 
As such, this process is very complex and typically involves a myriad of 
different actors. A study of peacebuilding has established that states and 
other actors understand that reconciliation or the process of relationship-
(re)building in a post-conflict context is very important (Smith 2004: 42). 
They are also willing to take part in those efforts. Indeed, for (above all 
Western) donor countries, reconciliation is one of the four main categories 
of initiatives that receive substantive donor support, after political and 
socio-economic development, but before security (Ibid.). 
However, the presence of myriad actors who are involved in this process 
also leads to problems. Therefore, in order to avoid duplication of work 
and to better co-ordinate their activities and supplement each other, 
various actors interested in the process of relationship-(re)building can 
participate in this process in the form of an MSP, understood as institutions 
that “bring together several stakeholders - i.e. actors (private or public) 
that have a shared interest in the outcome and demonstrate some degree 
1 This article is a result of empirical research conducted within the research project titled Multi-stakeholder Partnerships 
in Post-conflict Reconstruction: the Role of the European Union – MultiPart (www.multi-part.eu), supported by the 
European Commission under the Seventh Framework Programme of the European Union for research, technological 
development and demonstration activities, socio-economic and humanities research, grant agreement No. 217564. 
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of ownership - to address a particular issue”, whereby ownership refers 
to some form of resource investment and to participation in decision-
making in the MSP.2 In international relations, MSPs, together with other 
forms of multilateral co-operation beyond the nation-state, such as public 
policy networks, global partnerships and initiatives, have appeared after 
the 1992 Rio conference with a view to building a partnership between 
public and private, governmental and non-governmental actors to jointly 
address environmental and developmental problems, which should lead 
to better results than previously when such problems had been typically 
addressed, at the international level, by intergovernmental institutions 
and (individual) states (Martens 2007: 7).
With this new approach to global governance, the United Nations (UN) 
and other actors seek to achieve a number of secondary goals, in 
addition to managing a particular issue-area of international relations, 
such as peace-building, which is the focus of this paper. Among these 
secondary goals, reflected in the very word ‘partnership’, is the idea 
that this new form of co-operation will – while enabling partners to 
follow their own financial, ideological or other interests – also provide 
for a more legitimate, equitable and participatory (achieved through a 
more democratic decision-making) way of co-operation in international 
relations.3 In reality, however, these new forms of multilateral governance 
at different levels have not managed to overcome some of the ‘old’ 
collective-action problems. It is therefore not surprising that Martens (2007: 
7) is critical of the very concept of partnership between governmental/
state and non-governmental/non-state actors, “because it suggests that 
participants are working at the same level and share an equal status”, 
which is not the case. The use of the terms ‘partnership’ and ‘partners’ is 
of course not coincidental, as Zammit (2003: 51) points out with respect to 
development aid. 
There has been some debate about the benefits and achievements 
of this new form of multilateralism in international affairs, and about its 
obstacles and problems (Zammit 2003, Utting and Zammit 2006, Martens 
2 MultiPart (EU-funded 7th Framework Programme: FP7/2007-2013, grant agreement No. 217564): Final Report of Work 
Packages 2 and 3: Theoretical & Methodological Framework and Guidance for the Project, prepared by Scuola 
Superiore Sant’Anna (Pisa), University of Bradford and European Training and Research Centre for Human Rights and 
Democracy (Graz), p. 28. Hereinafter referred to as MultiPart: Theoretical & Methodological Framework.
3 MultiPart: Theoretical & Methodological Framework, p. 43.
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXI (72) - 2015
142
2007). What seems to be overlooked in this debate is the nature of the 
linkages between the international and local/national. This paper seeks to 
fill in this gap in one issue-area of international relations (i.e. relationship-
(re)building in a post-conflict context) where the types of actors, and 
levels at which they operate, appear particularly sensitive. This is because 
the very goal of relationship-(re)building involves local/national actors, 
former adversaries in a manifest conflict, but also because international 
actors are typically perceived through the conflict lenses – i.e. what their 
role was during the conflict and who they are (supposedly) siding with. 
By looking at the nature of this relationship through a detailed analysis 
of two cases of MSPs in the issue-area under discussion in Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, the paper seeks to unveil some of the issues that need to be 
taken into account, and further explored, with respect to this new form of 
multilateralism in a post-conflict context. 
The paper is divided into five substantive parts. After this brief introduction 
to the MSPs, two case studies are presented in section two, section three 
addresses the complexity of actors and their interests, which affect the 
functioning of MSPs, section four analyses a specific post-conflict context 
in which the two cases of MSPs operated, and section five deals with the 
internal characteristics of both MSPs. In concluding remarks in section six, 
I reflect on the findings based on these two case studies as applicable to 
the role of international actors in governing this issue-area. 
The context and actors: the SPARK and the Action Plan
The societal context and case selection
The two selected cases4 of MSPs active in the issue-area of reconciliation, 
inter-communal bridge-building and confidence-building are partnerships 
4 A detailed research report with empirical findings, based on desk research and field work (with a number of in-depth 
interviews with statekeholders and beneficiaries of the MSPs), can be found in: MultiPart (EU-funded 7th Framework 
Programme: FP7/2007-2013, grant agreement No. 217564): Final Report of Work Package 4d: Reconciliation, Inter-
communal Bridge-building and Confidence-building, prepared by the University of Ljubljana, the University of Florence 
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that were formed and operated in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The former 
suffered years of oppression under Serbian nationalist leader Slobodan 
Milošević, only to be finally engaged in a fully-fledged conflict in 1999 
that resulted in close to two million displaced persons, half of which 
remained in the Balkans for years afterwards (European Union 2013: 2). In 
this context, after the declaration of independence in February 2008 one 
of the biggest challenges of peace-building was and continues to be to 
reassure the return of displaced persons in general, and minority returns in 
particular. The MSP in Kosovo under examination here is a partnership that 
dealt with the issue of minority returns, called the Sustainable Partnerships 
for Assistance to Minority Returns in Kosovo (SPARK). During its existence 
between 2005 and 2009, SPARK provided “an integrated umbrella 
mechanism for delivering the full spectrum of multi-sectoral assistance for 
[sustainable minority] returns”, both for individual and spontaneous, and 
for organised and group returns.5 In reality this meant predominantly the 
building of new houses for the returnees, help in reconstruction of their 
houses, building of the infrastructure needed for a successful return, as 
well as working with the local community to accept the returnees.
Afghanistan, on the other hand, is a fragile state with unstable political 
institutions unable to deal with ethnic and other divisions that have 
crippled this country for decades. It was a playing ground for the two 
adversaries during the Cold War, whose withdrawal left the country with 
an ongoing societal conflict that ended in a hard-line Taliban rule in 1996. 
After the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America (USA), and the 
presence of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, the country was a target 
of a military intervention in 2001 by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
(NATO, which continues its presence in Afghanistan through 2014, in the 
framework of its International Security Assistance Force – ISAF) and allied 
forces. The Bonn conference in December 2001 then paved the way for 
internationally-sponsored and supervised post-conflict reconstruction 
with several dimensions, including political reconstruction with a new 
constitution and the first democratic presidential elections in 2004 (with 
Hamid Karzai as the first democratically elected president in internationally 
organised elections) (CIA 2014). 
In such a highly sensitive environment that is hardly described as a post-
5 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 280.
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXI (72) - 2015
144
conflict society, one of the key challenges in terms of relationship-(re)
building is the issue of transitional justice. Accordingly, the MSP under 
examination in Afghanistan is a nation-wide MSP called the Action Plan on 
Peace, Justice and Reconciliation: Action Plan of the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (the Action Plan), whose goal in the period 
of its existence between 2005 and 2008 was to promote “truth seeking 
and documentation; promotion of national unity and reconciliation; 
and the establishment of mechanisms for accountability.”6 The Action 
Plan thus sought to contribute to acknowledging of the suffering of the 
Afghan people, ensuring the formation of accountable institutions free of 
human rights violators and war criminals, helping in truth-seeking efforts 
and reconciliation and consequently to national unity.7
MSP formation and actors (partners) involved
The Action Plan was established following co-ordinated pressure by 
the international community, working with governmental and non-
governmental actors in the field of transitional justice in Afghanistan. 
It was launched (in December 2006) by the following ‘partners’: the 
Government of Afghanistan, the Afghan Independent Human Rights 
Commission (AIHRC) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA), but it had been presented and agreed upon at an 
international conference in The Hague in June 2005, attended by, among 
others, Afghan high level officials including ministers), Dutch Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights (UNHCHR),the European Union (EU) Special Representative, 
and representatives of the European Commission, the Governments of 
Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the USA, and Afghan national experts.8 Among 
international non-governmental partners, the most notable one was the 
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) that had been active, 
together with the AIHRC and UNAMA, in promoting accountability for 
massive human rights violations previously to the formation of the Action 
Plan. The ICTJ participated in the formulation of the Action Plan as a 
6 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 118.
7 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 136.
8 See a report on the Action Plan by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, at: http://www.aihrc.org.
af/media/files/Reports/Thematic%20reports/Action_Pln_Gov_Af.pdf (10 July 2014). 
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technical advisor.9
Similarly, the process of minority returns in Kosovo would not have begun 
without the commitment and help by the international community. Like 
other MSPs seeking to enable the return process in Kosovo, SPARK could not 
have been established without international actors for a number of reasons, 
including the poor economic situation in Kosovo, the lack of funding for 
housing and house reconstruction, and the non-existing institutions (national 
and local administration) capable of addressing such a difficult and 
conflictual issue. It was thus the United Nations (UN) that, in the UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999), placed the responsibility for the process of 
refugee and internally displaced peoples’ return within the UN Mission in 
Kosovo (UNMIK), which was to be assisted by the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR). SPARK was created 
according to UNMIK’s Manual for Sustainable Return 2005 and to the 
Strategy on Sustainable Return and Municipal Return Strategies of the Ministry 
for Communities and Returns (MCR), with the goal of a shared (international 
and local/national) responsibility for minority return, but with a gradual path 
towards achieving full responsibility by Kosovo national and local authorities. 
The leading partner in the formulation of SPARK in 2005 was the United Nations 
Development Program (UNDP), which was helped by UNMIK, UNHCR and 
the MCR. SPARK was in the beginning heavily owned by international actors, 
with the participation of the authorities, and the Employment Promotion 
Agency Kosovo. This international ‘domination’ was due to the lack of 
national funding and due to the undeveloped civil society in Kosovo, but 
the local NGO Developing Together was later involved in SPARK and so were 
individual members of UNIJA/M – i.e. an umbrella NGO composed of various 
associations of internally displaced persons.10 
The complexity of actors and their interests
Conflicts of interests or values occur not just between governmental actors 
9 MultiPart: Report 4d, pp. 93–4.
10 MultiPart: Report 4d, pp. 237–40.
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and the civil society or non-governmental actors (Scholte 2002), but they 
are very much part and parcel within the governmental sector. For MSPs 
this means that they will typically function in a context of conflicting state 
interests, as well as of competing or conflicting interests of international 
governmental institutions. The Action Plan in Afghanistan was significantly 
affected by such conflicting international views and interests: the emphasis 
by the US-led coalition on guaranteeing security as the key objective to be 
achieved with the help of the international community gradually pushed 
the issue of reconciliation to the second plan. With a gradual deterioration 
of security, every available resource available was needed to mitigate the 
problem. This included (former) warlords, the Taliban and others who were 
co-opted to the Afghan government and governmental institutions, thus 
further limiting all efforts to address past human rights violations and establish 
the necessary conditions for renewed inter-communal relations-building. 
Empirical research has shown that one of the reasons for the failure of the 
AP was also due to the fact that since the very beginning some external 
stakeholders in the international community were not genuinely inclined 
to deny their direct or indirect support to certain individuals – warlords or 
even war criminals – who played a key role in the Karzai administration 
and could allegedly guarantee the stabilization of the country and thus 
the protection of foreign interests.11
Whereas the USA gradually shifted away from transitional justice, the EU still 
supported the Action Plan, but some stakeholders clearly stated that the EU 
should have been putting more pressure on the USA for transitional justice.12
In addition to many different (also conflicting) interests at play in the 
complex international community, the diversity of international actors is 
likely to affect the very functioning of MSPs. At least two issues warrant 
attention in this respect: relations between the governmental and 
non-governmental sectors, and relations among international actors 
themselves (Jaeger 2007). With respect to the latter, it needs to be borne 
in mind that each actor (also) seeks to promote its own goals and interests, 
and many states are faced with balancing their individual interests with 
collective interests of international governmental organisations they are 
a member of, as well as with collective interests of partners/stakeholders 
11 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 102.
12 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 107–8.
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they work with in a particular issue-area.
Furthermore, such individual and collective interests of various international 
actors can be either contrary to the expectations of national/local 
actors and their needs, or can themselves be mutually competing or 
even mutually exclusive of one another. Frequently, international actors 
would thus find themselves competing for managing the same issues on 
the ground, or for setting the priorities for international action (a typical 
dilemma observed with respect to Afghanistan was the dilemma between 
prioritising either security or transitional justice).13 
With respect to the Action Plan, it has been argued that the process 
of reconciliation could have been more successful had international 
donors managed to agree on a clear platform and to avoid their mutual 
competition in terms of cross-funding groups, which was perceived 
as having further increased fragmentation. These differences among 
international (individual and collective) actors and the effects on 
the functioning of the Action Plan in particular, or on the process of 
reconciliation in general, could not be complemented by the very weak 
non-governmental sector.14
The limited resources tend to lead to competition in the already 
underfunded non-governmental sector. Non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) need to shop for projects in order to sustain themselves. This 
can have very negative effects on the actual beneficiaries and on their 
involvement on the ground, for they depend on preferences of donors, 
and not necessarily on the actual needs in post-conflict societies. In the 
early days of SPARK, there was a certain level of competition among 
NGOs, international and local, for finances and visibility. This developed 
into some kind of ‘NGO business’: NGOs often took the lead in drafting 
concept papers for projects. Those NGOs then typically also presented 
such project plans for approval to relevant decision-making bodies at 
the municipal level. This way, the projects benefitted NGOs and met their 
interests, rather than the interests of the municipalities, individuals and 
groups concerned.15 In the end, this ‘business’ certainly contributed to 
13 MultiPart: Report 4d, pp. 107–8.
14 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 109.
15 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 254.
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the fact that such projects were less successful.
Such competition at the international level can lead to several negative 
side effects at the local level. Firstly, it can increase patronage by foreign 
donors. This happened with the Action Plan, which gradually became 
perceived as ‘a foreign discourse’ – something that needed to be done, 
essentially to please the donors, rather than to help create the necessarily 
preconditions for relationship-(re)building in the Afghan society; the 
price to break the ‘internal ruling pacts’ seemed too high in the given 
circumstances of a lukewarm commitment by president Karzai and some 
other international partners. Secondly, international competition can 
affect behaviour locally. Local/national actors could play games with the 
donors in order to gain resources, possibly from several sources at once. 16 
All this can of course lead to sub-optimal outcomes. In an MSP context, 
the involvement of several (similar) actors therefore requires a great 
amount of co-ordination. When the latter is lacking, as was the case 
with respect to the UNDP and the UNHCR within SPARK’s food assistance 
component, this can lead to unwanted consequences. As the UNDP 
and the UNHCR reportedly failed to co-ordinate their activities in the 
field of food assistance and the delivery of food packages to displaced 
populations, beneficiaries in some municipalities ‘benefitted’ from this 
by obtaining extra food packages.17 The lack of inter-institutional (inter-
stakeholder) co-ordination thus led to the loss of resources and to the 
unequal distribution of assistance among the beneficiaries, which can 
further worsen inter-community relations in a post-conflict society.
With respect to relations between the governmental and non-
governmental sector within MSPs active in the issue-area under 
consideration, two trends can be observed. Firstly, the non-governmental 
sector depends on governments and governmental institutions in terms 
of financial support for projects and policies to be carried out on the 
ground. Reconciliation or relationship-(re)building in general cannot be 
achieved without the governmental support and commitment to this very 
difficult process at the political and social/societal levels. In Afghanistan, 
the lukewarm approach by President Karzai, with the tacit support of key 
16 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 109.
17 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 271.
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international actors who favoured security over transitional justice and 
reconciliation negatively affected the effectiveness of the Action Plan. 
By contrast, the commitment of the Kosovo government to the return 
process made it easier for the resettlement-related MSPs, including SPARK, 
as they faced no obstacles at the level of high politics. Instead of dealing 
with a lacking political support, stakeholders were trying to resolve a number 
of severe organisational and administrative problems. Still, where the lack 
of political will was very apparent was at the governmental level outside of 
the partnership – namely, in Serbia. This was particularly problematic after 
the Declaration of Independence in 2008, when SPARK ‘lost’ its legal basis 
(since the role of the UNMIK fundamentally changed and there were no 
Provisional Institutions of Self-Government in Kosovo), and the Republic of 
Serbia would not recognise Kosovo and Kosovo authorities. It was precisely 
these authorities that not only took full responsibility for the return process, 
but they also committed themselves to facilitate the return. The changed 
political status of Kosovo and the attitudes of key actors in the return process 
thus further undermined the level of trust, which resulted in a significantly 
smaller number of returnees following the Declaration of Independence 
in February 2008: in 2008, there were only 680 recorded minority returns, 
in comparison to 1,700 in 2007 (the numbers are contested, but several 
sources revealed a similar trend).18
Secondly, governmental policies and goals cannot be achieved without 
the participation of the non-governmental sector either. This is particularly 
the case when it comes to addressing highly sensitive issues of justice, 
reconciliation, property restitution, or land ownership. As far as MSPs in both 
post-conflict societies are concerned, the non-governmental sector not 
only supplemented the roles of governmental actors, but it assumed some 
of the key tasks that could not be carried out by the governmental actors. 
For example, the umbrella non-governmental organisation called UNIJA/M, 
with no formal relationship with SPARK, provided a key link between SPARK 
activities and the potential beneficiaries living in Serbia. In particular, the 
UNIJA/M’s members were advising returnees and helping them address 
their needs, and they collected the data on potential returnees, including 
those living in Serbia. Representatives of the UNIJA/M were inspecting 
SPARK activities in Kosovo (i.e. building of the houses) and monitoring the 
18 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 226.
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social climate in the receiving communities (in particular, if the receiving 
communities were open and positive towards the return process), and 
reporting on those activities to the interested individuals back in Serbia.19 
Similarly, the Action Plan in Afghanistan involved a number of NGOs. 
Indeed, it was through the Action Plan that many civil society organisations 
were encouraged to participate.20 This was both to compensate for the 
apparent lack of political will in the central authorities, and to use the Action 
Plan and external donations to help build Afghan civil society. In fact, the 
largely undeveloped civil society sector is very common for any post-conflict 
context and international NGOs will typically help in its development. In 
Kosovo, this started through the so-called twinning process.21 
In sum, the complexity of the international community needs to be 
taken into account in any analysis of international-local linkages within 
the context of MSPs, not only in terms of the sheer number of different 
international actors (which creates the problems of competition and co-
ordination of their activities), but also in terms of different types of actors. 
Accordingly, they face both a number of opportunities and constraints 
in their interactions with the national/local actors in general, and in their 
effort in peace building in particular. 
A difficult post-conflict environment in war-torn 
societies
Maintaining stability in a crisis area is an essential component for creating 
a successful working environment for international organisations. Various 
models, such as power sharing, can be applied to bring about stability 
(Bieber and Keil 2009), but they do not carry any guarantee that they 
will eventually serve their purpose – much depends on the complexity 
of a conflict. However, in war-torn societies, causes of conflicts are 
19 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 240. 
20 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 82. 
21 Thus, the Developing Together (a Kosovar NGO) was formed in 2004 with the help of GOAL Ireland, the UNHCR and 
the UNDP. See their website at: http://www.developingtogether.org [accessed 9 July 2014]. 
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anything but simple (Brown 1993, Ryan 1995). Several challenges need 
to be addressed; free and fair democratic elections, for example, are 
a precondition for legitimacy and credibility of the government. If the 
latter is credible in the eyes of the public, then the work of international 
organisations will be ‘tolerated’ and they are unlikely to be perceived 
as merely ‘supporters’ of the government in power. Second, stability 
of the government is another important element for a more cohesive 
approach by international actors, hopefully in line with what the stable, 
democratically elected government sees as key priorities. Frequent 
changes in government, frictions in coalitions or a generally weak 
government (further weakened by corruption scandals, among others) 
damage the continuity of relations between international organisations 
and governmental officials. In a similar fashion, successful management 
of inter-ethnic relations (which are often the main instrument for the 
occurrence of a conflict in the first place, although there is nothing to 
suggest that ethnic differences as such lead to conflict – see Ryan 
1995: 23) leads to a more stable working environment for international 
organisations. Last but not least, the adherence to basic norms such as 
the rule of law, human rights and the fight against corruption would make 
it easier for international organisations to do their work.
As already indicated, hardly any of these conditions are met in war-torn 
societies, recently emerged or still emerging (Afghanistan) from a violent 
conflict. This meant that the MSPs working in the field of reconciliation, 
inter-communal bridge-building and confidence-building, needed 
international involvement that had to go way beyond mere ‘moral 
support’ – not just in terms of funding, but above all in terms of providing 
the personnel with the skills and legitimacy needed to carry out the 
planned activities aimed to contribute towards relationship-(re)building. 
In Kosovo, for example, the high sensitivity of the return process and the 
lack of legitimate and skilled local administration meant that international 
actors were directly and hands-on involved in SPARK. They served as 
mediators between the communities (formerly) in conflict (which was 
particularly important when the Serbs were blocking any communication 
with the Albanian authorities, deemed as illegitimate by Serbia), for they 
were perceived as more independent, credible and trustful.22
22  MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 267.
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The lack of local capabilities and very poor competences of the local 
administration directly involved in carrying out SPARK’s objective was 
something that the international community was aware of. Accordingly, 
one of the goals of SPARK was also to help the locals gain the necessary 
competences to be able to carry out the return process on their own. 
However, because international actors were perceived, at least initially, 
as more legitimate, apolitical, more competent and impartial, but also 
more effective, such local capacity building was limited in its scope and 
success. The transfer of competences was further affected by the final 
settlement of the political status of Kosovo, whereby local and municipal 
authorities were expected to develop their competences and follow the 
norms and standards before the decision on the final status was going to 
be made. In practice, however, this logic was not followed and the issue 
of the final status very much affected day-to-day politics, including the 
functioning of SPARK.23
Furthermore, political culture and corruption in Kosovo made it very 
difficult for any partnership to function efficiently. SPARK was no exception 
in this respect. The ministry responsible for the return process (i.e. the MCR) 
changed four heads (ministers) in four years, either due to corruption 
scandals or due to their over prioritisation of some municipalities.24 In 
such an environment, it is very difficult to achieve trust, confidence or 
even fairness. Such an environment will also further support the views 
that international actors, present on the ground with their international 
staff, will be respected more, and the word by these internationals will be 
taken more seriously than a word by an equally qualified and competent 
Kosovar. Similarly, endeavours of local organisations will come second to 
those of international actors: the relevant stakeholders will prefer to work 
with international, rather than local, organisations.25 Such perceptions, 
of course, negatively affect the long-term peace building process at 
the national/local level and they can hardly contribute to effective 
relationship-(re)building. 
Because in the initial phases of the post-conflict reconstruction efforts, 
there are hardly any competent (skilled) local administrators, and very 
23  MultiPart: Report 4d, pp. 237–8, 273. 
24  MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 252.
25  MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 257.
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few at the national level, international actors are faced with several 
process-related obstacles that are, however, essential in achieving the 
final objectives of any joint project, including the MSPs’ specific goals. 
One of the effects of both MSPs in the issue-area under consideration was 
therefore the process of capacity-building. International actors played a 
crucial role – either before the official beginning of an individual MSP, 
or during its duration (SPARK). SPARK in particular was always aimed at 
enabling the national and local institutions in Kosovo (the governmental 
and municipalities) to be able to carry out the return process on their own, 
in co-operation with the non-governmental sector.26 Capacity building 
by international actors has, of course, not been limited to the context of 
individual MSPs. 
One of the problems international actors face when they ‘enter’ a country 
is the selection of their local partners. Frequently, the same individuals 
(typically educated in the West or able to speak English) end up working 
in many different projects. An even worse case scenario would lead to 
co-opting powerful individuals, some of which may have even played an 
active role during the conflict itself. For international actors working in the 
field of reconciliation, inter-communal bridge-building and confidence-
building, such an intentional or unintentional involvement of those 
individuals – with a view to protecting (some) foreign interests, by some 
(typically more powerful) international actors – is even more problematic 
as it may undermine any effort in peace building in post-conflict societies. 
Both MSPs under examination had to deal with the presence of such 
powerful individuals: warlords sitting in the Afghan government, and some 
local mayors, former leading figures in the Kosovo Liberation Army who 
had the power and credibility among the local population to carry out 
the minority return process should they decide to do so.27
Perhaps an even more problematic issue is the lack of support, rather 
than merely lack of competences and skills or organisational difficulties, 
by the high-level politicians in a post-conflict society itself. International 
involvement in post-conflict reconstruction is based on the assumption 
26 MultiPart: Report 4d, pp. 236, 248, 258.
27 MultiPart: Report 4d. In our interviews in Kosovo in 2010, many individuals pointed at some ‘very efficient mayors’ in the 
return process, and when asked why some municipalities assure a relatively wide return process and some made very 
little progress, they typically referred to the mayors. When further asked about those specific mayors, it was clear that 
they won the elections due to their leadership skills during the war. For a full list of 19 in-depth interviews conducted to 
analyse the formation and functioning of SPARK, see MultiPart: Report 4d, pp. 278–9. 
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that international help is not just needed, but it is also welcome at the local 
level, by war-torn societies. Once the political system is (re-)established, 
it is assumed that the newly elected government and other institutions 
would continue supporting joint post-conflict reconstruction, with an ever 
increasing number of competences being transferred to and assumed 
by the local (elected) institutions and individuals occupying the posts. 
However, such local support may be lacking, particularly with respect to 
such sensitive issues as those appertaining to the process of reconciliation, 
including transitional justice. In this respect, President Karzai’s ambiguous 
attitudes towards the Action Plan need to be mentioned. 
In order to address such a serious problem of lacking domestic support, the 
Action Plan’s stakeholders called on international organisations to attach 
some conditions to their funding.28 The system of conditionality has been 
developed in greater detail by international institutions such as the EU, in 
its external relations with third countries (including in the area of donor 
aid), and more recently, in the process of enlargement (Pridham 2005, 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005, Bechev 2006, Schimmelfennig 
2008, Sedelmeier 2008), leading to what has been described as ‘network 
governance’ (Lavenex 2008). The concept of conditionality can, indeed, 
be usefully applied also to a post-conflict setting where (international) 
pragmatism will not guarantee progress in all essential issue-areas to be 
dealt with. The unpopular and highly sensitive issue-area of reconciliation, 
inter-communal bridge-building and confidence-building is particularly 
vulnerable to negative consequences of pragmatic internal politics as 
both case studies of MSPs have demonstrated.29
28 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 108.
29 See MultiPart: Report 4d.
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Internal organisation and behaviour of international 
actors 
In specific post-conflict settings, where international involvement is urgently 
needed to promote and support the efforts aimed at relationship-(re)
building, scholarly attention is first and foremost focused on environment-
related factors affecting the success rate of those endeavours. Whereas 
contextual circumstances, particularly the lack of functioning institutions, 
lack of inter-community trust, and a very difficult socio-economic situation 
(e.g. high unemployment, hardly any intra-state income-generating 
economic activity), clearly have a crucial impact on the functioning 
of MSPs working in the issue-area under examination here, some other 
least likely factors affecting this process, though indirectly, should not 
be overlooked. In particular, the very organisation and functioning of 
international actors, in general, and international institutions, in particular, 
warrant more attention. For some forms of behaviour of individual 
international actors, or the lack thereof, can have a significant impact 
on the functioning of MSPs and, consequently, on their effect on the 
processes of relationship-(re)building.
There are several aspects to this issue. With respect to states and their 
roles in MSPs, particularly as donors, their involvement in post-conflict 
reconstruction depends on several factors. These include a specific 
commitment to helping societies with which individual countries have 
been linked historically (e.g. during the period of colonisation), politically 
(e.g. within the same multi-national state such as Yugoslavia), ethnically 
(transnational ethnic ties have been known to affect the foreign policy 
of individual states; see Moore and Davis 1998), or economically (e.g. if 
a country sees economic potential in a post-conflict society, it may be 
willing to contribute to different aspects of post-conflict reconstruction, 
also with a view to gaining trust and legitimacy or to establish contacts). 
Individual states can be involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts also 
for purely or at least predominantly normative reasons – to help establish 
democratic societies, where human rights and fundamental freedoms 
are fully respected, and basic needs provided. Scandinavian countries in 
particular have established themselves as such honest ‘norm promoters’ 
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXI (72) - 2015
156
Whereas states have a number of legitimate interests in helping others to 
overcome the problems related to a specific post-conflict situation, of such 
interests some are problematic, as are the motivations for their involvement 
in other countries. Importantly, such interests and motivations can change 
over time as they are subject to governmental support (note a changing 
focus of the USA in Afghanistan, which made it hard for the partners in 
the Action Plan to effectively focus on reconciliation and transitional 
justice). A government may also decide to shift its geographical foreign 
policy priorities, to ignore the newly emerging needs in some regions or to 
readjust the amount of foreign aid. Or, a government with a clear interest 
in international post-conflict efforts can lose elections and be replaced by 
a differently oriented government. All these will undoubtedly affect any 
process of relationship-(re)building and MSPs working to achieve this goal.
From a theoretical perspective, international actors (states) play a two level 
game, whereby their behaviour at the international level is also closely related 
to the developments (interests, power, norms and values) domestically (see 
Putnam 1988). In order to understand the role of the international community 
in MSPs and in post-conflict reconstruction more generally, one needs to 
understand and monitor also the domestic level of international actors. 
In other words, the local/national context bears a double significance – in 
a post-conflict country itself, and in other states involved in post-conflict 
reconstruction, possibly within MSPs. 
With respect to international institutions, the intra-actor explanations would 
include issues that appertain to the way an institution is organised, and 
consequently, to the issue of as to whether or not an institution is capable and 
willing to provide the help most needed and most expected by actors in war-
torn societies. In this respect, MSPs are a very useful tool for addressing specific 
needs at the local level, particularly if a partnership is made of competent 
institutions that seek to complement each other, rather than compete against 
each other, in the post-conflict reconstruction. This minimises any duplication 
of work and is likely to increase effectiveness on the ground.
As international organisations are themselves dependent on member states 
and their willingness to support them financially, politically and organisationally, 
such a co-ordinated endeavour that addresses the ‘right’ needs at the right 
time, without any unnecessary delay, may be a huge task. It is difficult for 
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international governmental institutions to live up to the many expectations 
at the local level, in individual post-conflict societies.30 They are often blamed 
for inaction although it can be their member states that purposefully ignore 
clearly stated local needs as presented to member states by the staff of 
those organisations. As a result, those organisations may be faced with bad 
reputation in a particular area, and their future involvement will be much 
more difficult if not impossible.
In other cases, however, the intra-institutional (political) dynamics can 
prevent international institutions from acting, or from acting effectively. 
For instance, the EU is frequently blamed for its ineffectiveness, which is 
made even worse given its normative and political power. In other words, 
what can be observed with respect to the EU are its economic power, as 
well as its unparalleled normative power (Manners 2002). Local actors (in 
post-conflict societies) thus look up to the EU for help in their reconstruction 
and in peace building efforts. Indeed, as argued by Diez and Pace 
(2007: 1), the EU’s ability to transform conflicts through its involvement in 
partnerships or directly “largely depends on this acceptance of the notion 
of normative power Europe.”
Thus, it was the EU that – even in the wake of US-led prioritising security of 
Afghanistan over reconciliation – clearly stated its continuous commitment to, 
among others, strengthening Afghanistani civil institutions and implementing 
the Action Plan. According to a Swedish diplomat, interviewed to assess the 
role of the EU in the functioning of the Action Plan, the EU’s commitment in this 
respect was logical given that for the EU, “the rule of law, securing peace and 
justice is vital to Afghanistan and they need to be strengthened. […] Impunity 
from punishment is not acceptable and no one entitles impunity”.31 Still, the 
changing attitudes in Washington (i.e. decreased support to the transitional 
justice process in Afghanistan as this was perceived to endanger the most 
important goal – security), have weakened the leverage of the EU within the 
Action Plan. The empirical analysis of the Action Plan demonstrates that the 
EU has been very influential in some aspects of the Action Plan, it has also 
failed to meet the expectations to use its normative commitment in relation 
30 This state of affairs has been well portrayed by the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, Boutros-Boutros 
Ghali. Asked about the efficiency of UN peace operations, with specific reference to the prospects of USA withdrawal 
from Somalia in 1993, he replied: “I can do nothing. I have no army, I have no money, I have no experts. I am borrowing 
everything. If the member states don't want, what can I do? The reality is to avoid giving promises which you are not 
able to fulfil.” (Meisler 1993).
31 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 112.
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to Washington. 
Although the EU is perceived as a political, economic and normative 
power, with a significant leverage, governments such as Kosovo’s 
(although in Kosovo, the Americans are perceived as ‘liberators’, 
following the US-led NATO operation in the 1990s, and the EU’s normative 
power stems largely from Kosovo’s goal to become a member of the 
EU), local actors, including stakeholders in MSPs working in the issue-area 
of relationships-(re)building, have observed that the EU is significantly 
weakened by its intra-institutional dynamics. It tends to be perceived as a 
somewhat problematic partner because, as it was frequently observed, 
it does not speak with one voice, and it never makes decisions fast.32 In 
Afghanistan, the EU was perceived as not having used all of its potential 
to help in peace building efforts, due to a lack of sufficient co-ordination 
by the member states and also due to the lack of their willingness to share 
‘their prestige’ in their effort, and because of their mutual competition, 
which painfully displayed their collective inability to implement the goals 
in the post-conflict reconstruction of Afghanistan.33
Another general aspect of the intra-institutional dynamics, particularly 
relevant in the context of MSPs working in the issue-area that is analysed 
here, is related to planning and to its time dimension. In particular, it is very 
clear that peace-building is a very long-term goal that requires a set of 
carefully planned and executed activities. This, however, appears to be 
far from the annual budgets of international actors, as well as from their 
slow intra-institutional procedures to approve specific projects. In general, 
international institutions have been criticised by local stakeholders for 
the duration of their internal procedures (i.e. between an initiative and a 
decision by an institution that it was going to support the initiative), and for 
the uncertainty of this process.34 
Such uncertainty or short-term projects eager to satisfy constituencies 
(voters) in donor countries can negatively affect the already fragile trust 
and confidence among the communities, or it can diminish all efforts for 
building trust in local institutions. If they stop providing certain services, or if 
32 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 269.
33  MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 112
34 This also applies to the Action Plan (MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 96).
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they stop working in a specific issue-area (e.g. the return process can slow 
down if funds are not available; if truth seeking commissions stop working, 
this will further increase the perception of injustice), this is likely to have 
negative effects on the long-term peace-building efforts, but it can also 
undermine the steps already taken towards this goal. 
International institutions further face a potential problem of sustaining 
‘institutional memory’ when it comes to field-related projects. The 
relatively frequent personnel turn-over, particularly in countries such 
as Afghanistan, makes it more difficult to retain the trust and good 
working relations between the internationals and the locals. This is of 
course essential, particularly in the most sensitive issues in a post-conflict 
setting. International organisations were also faced with the issue of 
their credibility, particularly with respect to the high costs of their own 
operation. This is particularly problematic in war-torn societies, faced with 
the problem of fulfilling even the most basic human needs. In Kosovo, 
where the bulk of the money for the return process was contributed by the 
Kosovo government, this was very apparent. The UNDP in particular was 
frequently faced with complaints that international organisations were 
simply too expensive and that they are spending money that should go 
towards the actual process of minority return.35 
Concluding remarks
Both cases of MSPs working towards the goal of relationship-(re)building 
in Kosovo and Afghanistan have demonstrated both the value and the 
problems associated with this new form of multilateral management of 
a particular issue-area. Of course, the issue-area of interest here is a very 
sensitive one in a post-conflict context. Furthermore, it is an issue-area 
that requires long-term commitment that will hopefully bring about the 
desirable results in the long term, with many immediate and mid-term 
steps in this direction. Both MSPs, the Action Plan and SPARK, need to be 
assessed as providing a number of such smaller steps. Still, as the analysis 
35 MultiPart: Report 4d, p. 268.
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of both MSPs has revealed, they do offer some important insights into the 
functioning of MSPs in the field of relationship-(re)building – i.e. insights that 
are useful for understanding the role of international actors in governing 
this issue-area, and that point us in the direction of further research of 
MSPs or post-conflict reconstruction in general.
In post-conflict societies, efforts to secure reconciliation, inter-
communal bridge-building and confidence-building largely depend 
on the involvement of the international community. As these processes 
necessarily require the participation of local actors, the MSP context 
appears to provide a suitable way of collectively managing the issue-
area of relationships-(re)building. International actors (above all 
international governmental organisations and individual states, acting 
alone or within those organisations) can indeed affect the functioning 
of MSPs and consequently actions and policies of national (local) actors 
in a post-conflict society. Such external incentives can be reasonably 
expected to both contribute to inter-community relationship-(re)building 
and foster long-term reconciliation, but they can also prevent such 
processes from taking place, or slow them down significantly. In other 
words, the presence of international actors alone, even though they will 
co-ordinate their activities in the framework of an MSP, does not in itself 
guarantee any reconciliation. In fact, there are a number of obstacles 
that need to be borne in mind to avoid worsening the situation on the 
ground. As the empirical research of the two selected MSPs in these 
countries has demonstrated, the role of the international community, 
particularly international governmental organisations, individual states 
and international NGOs, in post-conflict settings can be very ambiguous. 
At least four conclusions can be drawn from the two case studies. 
Firstly, any competition in values and goals between key international 
stakeholders is likely to slow down relationship-(re)building nationally. 
Secondly, international actors are likely to be more successful with the 
projects they fund if there is strong national and local support for the 
goals that are to be achieved by MSPs. Thirdly, MSPs in the issue-area 
of reconciliation, inter-communal bridge-building and confidence-
building will function better if partners properly deal with the individuals 
that played an active role during the conflict as those individuals may 
have a significant impact on the results of MSPs. Fourthly, intra-institutional 
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dynamics matter: international actors (international organisations in 
particular) will achieve more if they are well organised internally so that 
local actors will see them as credible partners (it will be even better if 
this credibility only supplements the overall trust in those institutions due to 
their role in the conflict management process).   
Of course, to fully understand the influence and impact of MSPs 
or international actors that participate in such partnerships in the 
management of post-conflict societies such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, 
one must also identify the main factors that facilitate or constrain such 
influence. For example, in terms of a political system: are the countries in 
question democracies? What kind of ‘help’ can third countries provide to 
war-torn societies/countries? Are there any issues from history that have so 
far not been successfully addressed (e.g. border delimitation, minorities, 
intra-ethnic conflicts etc.) but will necessarily address the broader process 
of reconciliation, for example? What is the distribution of power – is there 
an equilibrium or is it that one or more countries in the region have a 
preponderant role? What is the state of the economy in a country and in 
the broader region? 
Once these questions are answered, research will need to focus on 
unveiling some causal mechanisms between the composition and 
functioning of MSPs and their end results in terms of post-conflict 
reconstruction. This will need to be done by at least two levels of analysis, 
both focusing on the context (structure) and actors: firstly, at the level of 
the international community itself, characterised by its complex structure, 
with many different actors seeking to achieve their own objectives in 
a very competitive environment; secondly, at the national/local level 
where there are many difficult conditions in war-torn societies that are 
operationally/institutionally unable to begin any peace building processes 
on their own, and where characteristics (motivations, organisation) of 
international actors themselves will certainly matter when it comes to 
relationship-(re)building efforts in the context of MSPs. 
Because these factors have an impact on how international institutions 
function, they are relevant also for studying the functioning of MSPs, in 
their entire ‘life cycle’. As international institutions play a very important 
role in international governance, they can be expected to have an 
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impact on the formation of MSPs, on their performance and on their 
effects. By implication, the international community can therefore 
influence the processes of reconciliation, inter-communal bridge-building 
and confidence-building. What is still very much unknown is how these 
processes can be stirred in the desirable direction, for there are many 
obstacles that can prevent international institutions from helping to 
promote inter-communal relationship building in post-conflict societies.
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXI (72) - 2015
163
Bibliography
Bar-Tal, D., Bennink, G. H., 2004. The Nature of Reconciliation as an 
Outcome and a Process. In: Bar-Simon-Tov, Y., ed. From Conflict 
Resolution to Reconciliation, 11–38. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bechev, D., 2006. Carrots, sticks and norms: the EU and regional 
cooperation in Southeast Europe. Journal of Southern Europe and 
the Balkans, 8(1): 27-43.
Bieber, F., Keil, S., 2009. Power-Sharing Revisited: Lessons Learned in the 
Balkans? Review of Central & East European Law, 34(4): 337-360.
Bloomfield, D., Barnes, T., Huyse, L., 2003. Reconciliation After Violent 
Conflict: A Handbook. Stockholm: IDEA.
Brown, M. E., 1993. Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict. In: Brown, 
M. E., ed. Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 3-26. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
CIA, 2014. The World Factbook – Afghanistan. Available at: https://www.
cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html 
[accessed 10 July 2014].
Diez, T., Pace, M., 2007. ‘Normative Power Europe and Conflict 
Transformation’. Paper for Presentation at the 2007 EUSA Conference, 
Montreal, 17-19 May. Available at: http://www.unc.edu/euce/
eusa2007/papers/diez-t-01a.pdf [accessed 10 April 2013]. 
European Union, 2013. European Union Office in Kosovo: 2013 Annual 
Programme – return and Reintegration of Minority Communities, 
03 - 2013 / 02. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/
pdf/kosovo/ipa/2013/ipa_2013_pf3_return_and_reintegration.pdf 
[accessed 15 July 2014].
Finnemore, M., Sikkink, K., 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change. International Organization, 52(4): 887-917.




o. 66 - 2012
XXI (72) - 2015
164
Jaeger, H.-M., 2007. “Global Civil Society” and the Political Depoliticization 
of Global Governance. International Political Sociology, 1(3): 257-277.
Kriesberg, L., 2001. Changing Forms of Coexistence. In: Abu-Nimer, M., 
ed., Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence: Theory and Practice, 
46–64. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
Lavenex, S., 2008. A governance perspective on the European 
neighbourhood policy: integration beyond conditionality? Journal 
of European Public Policy, 15(6): 938-55.
Lederach, J. P., 1997. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Lederach, J. P., 2001. Civil Society and Reconciliation. In: Turbulent Peace: 
the Challenges of Managing International Conflict, 841–854. 
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press. 
Manners, I., 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(2): 235-258.
Martens, J., 2007. Multistakeholder Partnerships – Future Models of 
Multilateralism?, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Occasional Papers: 
Dialogue on Globalization No. 29, Berlin. Available at: http://library.
fes.de/pdf-files/iez/04244.pdf [accessed 14 June 2014].
McCandles, E., 2001. The Case of Land in Zimbabwe: Causes of 
Conflict, foundation for Sustained Peace. In: Abu-Nimer, M., ed., 
Reconciliation, Justice and Coexistence: Theory and Practice, 209–
222. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Meisler, S., 1993. Interview: ‘Somebody Will Have to Play Policeman’. Los 
Angeles Times, November 9. Available at: http://articles.latimes.
com/1993-11-09/news/wr-54754_1_peace-enforcement [accessed 
5 July 2014]. 
Moore, W. H., Davis, D. R., 1998. Transnational ethnic ties and foreign 
policy. In: Lake, D. A., Rothchild, D., eds., The international spread 
of ethnic conflict: fear, diffusion, and escalation, 89-103. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
MultiPart (EU-funded 7th Framework Programme: FP7/2007-2013, grant 
agreement No. 217564). Final Report of Work Packages 2 and 3: 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXI (72) - 2015
165
Theoretical & Methodological Framework and Guidance for the 
Project, 222 pp. Available at: http://www.multi-part.eu/images/
contenuti/wp_2_3_final_report.pdf [accessed 23 May 2014].
MultiPart (EU-funded 7th Framework Programme: FP7/2007-2013, grant 
agreement No. 217564): Final Report of Work Package 4d: 
Reconciliation, Inter-communal Bridge-building and Confidence-
building, 293 pp. Available at: http://www.multi-part.eu/images/
contenuti/wp_4d_final_report.pdf [accessed 10 April 2013].
Pridham, G., 2005. Designing Democracy: EU Enlargement and Regime 
Change in Post-Communist Europe. Houndmills/New York: 
Palgrave/Macmillan.
Putnam, R. D., 1988. Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-
level games. International Organization, 42(3): 427-460.
Ryan, S., 1995. Ethnic Conflict and International Relations. Aldershot/
Brookfield USA/Singapore/Sydney: Dartmouth, Second edition.
Schimmelfennig, F., 2008. EU political accession conditionality after the 
2004 enlargement: consistency and effectiveness. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 15(6): 918-937.
Schimmelfennig, F., Sedelmeier, U., 2005. Introduction: Conceptualizing the 
Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. In: Schimmelfennig, 
F., Sedelmeier, U., eds., The Europeanization of Central and Eastern 
Europe, 1-28. Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press.
Scholte, J. A., 2002. Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance. 
Global Governance, 8(3): 281-304.
Sedelmeier, U., 2008. After conditionality: post-accession compliance with 
EU law in East Central Europe. Journal of European Public Policy, 
15(6): 806-825.
Smith, D., 2004. Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting 
Their Act Together: Overview Report of the Joint Utstein Study of 
Peacebuilding. Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Utting, P., Zammit, A., 2006. Beyond Pragmatism: Appraising UN-




o. 66 - 2012
XXI (72) - 2015
166
Zammit, A., 2003. Development at Risk: Rethinking UN-Business Partnership. 
Geneva: The South Centre and Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development.
Petra Roter (petra.roter@fdv.uni-lj.si) received her PhD from the 
University of Cambridge, and is now an Associate Professor of 
International Relations at the University of Ljubljana, Faculty of 
Social Sciences, where she co-ordinates the MA programme 
in International Relations and is a national director for 
the European MA in Human Rights and Democratisation. 
Her publications cover issues of ethno-national diversity 
management, minority protection, international regimes and 
norms. She is co-editor of the Journal of International Relations 
and Development. She is a member (in respect of Slovenia) of 
the Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe’s Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and as 
an independent expert, she occasionally co-operates with 
the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities.
